Thomas Jefferson University

Jefferson Digital Commons
American Red Cross base hospital no. 38 in the
world war. United States army base hospital no.
38, organized under the auspices of the
Jefferson Medical College and Hospital,
stationed at Nantes, France, 1918-1919, by W.
M. L. Coplin.

American Red Cross Base Hospital No. 38

2-1923

American Red Cross Base Hospital No. 38 in the World War - III:
Hospitalization in the American Expeditionary Forces - Hospital
Centers

Follow this and additional works at: https://jdc.jefferson.edu/american_red_cross_base_hospital
Part of the History of Science, Technology, and Medicine Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you
Recommended Citation
"American Red Cross Base Hospital No. 38 in the World War - III: Hospitalization in the American
Expeditionary Forces - Hospital Centers" (1923). American Red Cross base hospital no. 38 in the
world war. United States army base hospital no. 38, organized under the auspices of the
Jefferson Medical College and Hospital, stationed at Nantes, France, 1918-1919, by W. M. L.
Coplin.. Paper 24.
https://jdc.jefferson.edu/american_red_cross_base_hospital/24
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Jefferson Digital Commons. The Jefferson Digital
Commons is a service of Thomas Jefferson University's Center for Teaching and Learning (CTL). The Commons is
a showcase for Jefferson books and journals, peer-reviewed scholarly publications, unique historical collections
from the University archives, and teaching tools. The Jefferson Digital Commons allows researchers and interested
readers anywhere in the world to learn about and keep up to date with Jefferson scholarship. This article has been
accepted for inclusion in American Red Cross base hospital no. 38 in the world war. United States army base
hospital no. 38, organized under the auspices of the Jefferson Medical College and Hospital, stationed at Nantes,
France, 1918-1919, by W. M. L. Coplin. by an authorized administrator of the Jefferson Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact: JeffersonDigitalCommons@jefferson.edu.

III

HOSPITALIZATION IN THE A.R.F.
HOSPITAL CENTERS

B

E F OR E proceeding with the history of Base
Hospital No. 38 it may be well to say something
of the general plan of army hospitalization operated in France; especially is this desirable because constant reference will be made to the subject and many
terms will be used that would, in the absence of any introductory explanation, probably appear obscure to the
uninitiated and casual reader. In approaching this war
it is reasonable to suppose that at one time it was not
believed that a foreign military force of vast proportions
would be necessary; however, the aggressive endurance
of the central powers and the terrific Allied wastage
resulting from casualties, which, from battle deaths
alone, amounted to nearly 5,000,000 men before the end
of 1918, made imperative an overseas force of a magnitude previously never contemplated and an achievement
in expeditionary mobilization and transportation unprecedented in the history of nations. In April, 1918,
the Germans had a rifle superiority of 324,000; by June
the Allied strength exceeded that of the central powers,
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and in November this lead attained 600,000. The United
States sent to France 2,084,000 soldiers; of these,
1,390,000 saw active service at the front."
In this, the bloodiest war in history, our allies had suffered heavily, approaching in losses those of the Crimea,
which held the previous mortality record; in the present
conflict, combat and battle casualties for the first time
exceeded losses and wastage from disease; among our
allies of 100 men called to the colors, 20 to 25 were killed
or died; the American loss during the period of hostilities, was 2 killed or died, for 100 who took part. There
are many other and more important explanations for
the enormously greater loss by our allies, but the efficient
organization of relief and the elaborate and comprehensive schemes of hospitalization must be given due weight.
The total overseas bed capacity of 50,000 in July, 1918,
reached 250,000 by November with an easily possibl e
crisis accommodation for 300,000 sick and wounded.
The program was considered elaborate, even extravagant; such a view would appear to be further justified
by the fact that the number of beds actually occupied did
not exceed 200,000. If, howev.er, one recalls that combat
ceased November 11, 1918, just before the maximum
capacity was attained, and if one takes into consideration
the enormous demand that must have arisen had the
armistice not intervened, it becomes apparent that any.. The figures quoted here and elsewh er e are t hose given by Col. Leonard
P. Ayres of th e General Staff, in hi s st a t ist ical summa ry of "The War with
Germany," issued by the Government Printing Office, Wa shington, 1919.
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thing less broad and comprehensive might readily have
been disastrously too small and certainly would have
permitted no factor of safety so absolutely necessary to
deal with unexpected epidemics, unforeseen and excessive casualties, building and other losses due to floods,
storms, fires and possible capture; the last no American
ever believed possible. The bombing and destruction
of rail-lines, inordinate transportation dangers, unforeseen supply stress over some approach to the battle zone
or along one pathway of evacuation might, at any time,
have made unpracticable the use of a large hospital
group and consequently have thrown an excessively
heavy load on some other area. Any plan of hospitalization that provided no factor of safety must obviously
have been deplorably insufficient. The scheme outlined
and the results attained deserve every commendation;
if there was one sound criticism that appeared fully justified it was that trained, equipped and mobilized units
such as "38" should have been overseas months sooner,
the long Armory wait to which "38" and other base
hospitals were subjected must be deplored; however, the
critically inclined must recall that combat groups were
urgently needed, that strained lines, faced by aggressive
drives, were holding by a thread, might be broken at any
time, that the central powers were numerically ahead.
that they were feeling out possible weak sectors, that
both sides trembled with apprehension, and that military disaster might come to the heroic defenders at any
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moment. It was better to strain every nerve to fore stall
any such calamity and to pour into France an everincreasing combative force, trusting to sustained effort
for bringing to maturity, and in time, the perfected program of hospitalization fully outlined and splendidly
advanced on this side, ready for service and transportable on the shortest notice.
Therefore, while "38" fumed and fretted in the Armory, fought the battle of Stenton Field and all but
mutinied at Chadd's Ford, opportunity and facilities
were maturing in the A. E. F.; new construction was
speeding up in France, elaborate preparations were
making and, all in good time, our call would come. The
first bases to go over were, for the most part, sent
directly to Allied relief, usually British, and served in
buildings prepared by those whom they were detailed to
help. A little later the new arrivals were assigned to
permanent buildings, schools, colleges, resort hotels,
monasteries, etc., taken over by the French and allotted
to Americans. Thirty-eight, however, was to be a part
of a "Hospital Center," one of the large bases contemplated in the great scheme of developing hospitalization
in the A. E. F.
A "Hospital Center" was planned to provide a group
of Base Hospitals, varying in number from 4 to 10, or,
should occasion arise, possibly 20; each was to maintain
its identity, and, so far as possible, its personnel, to provide 1000 to 2000 beds and, in part, to discharge into an
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attached convalescent camp having a capacity of 5000
to 10,000 men. The Center was under the general direction and supervision of a Headquarters Staff, comprising a Commanding Officer, Laboratory Officer, Sanitary
Officer and other consulting members, Quartermaster,
Supply Officer, Adjutant and clerical service. The individual bases, or participating units were, as stated,
largely autonomous but subordinate to the H. Q. of th e
Center. Certain large facilities under the direct control
of Officer of H. Q., served all subsidiary units; these
embraced the Consulting Experts, including the Laboratory Officer, any and each of whom could visit and
assist, if necessary, direct action in any base compassed
by the Center. The H. Q. Supply Officer and Quartermaster issued supplies to the corresponding respective
officers in the participating organizations. A common
laundry, often of huge capacity, served the entire Center; commonly upon a central double track, hospital
trains came in and H. Q. directed the distribution of
patients;- spurs and switches, sometimes miles of tracks
were necessary to handle the enormous loads of incoming
supplies without in any way interfering with the arrival
and dispatch of hospital trains, or the reception and discharge of patients.
Some of these "Centers" attained pretentious dimensions "and still larger ones were in progress of construction or extension when hostilities ceased. N antes might
have reached a capacity of 10,000 to 12,000, possibly
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under stress 15,000 beds; Allery more than doubled
N antes, and the Center at Beaune, Cote d'Or, was extending to a rated capacity including convalescent camp,
exceeding 30,000 with, in a monastery nearby, a department for carriers of communicable disease, the size of
which could not be foretold, but it is quite possible that
an additional 5000 would have been included.
In addition to the more general administrative and
other advantages accomplished by centralization, it was
possible better to classify and segregate certain cases;
one hospital, in part or almost as a whole, would receive
communicable disease which could be still further subdivided; to another unit could be assigned nervous and
mental patients; one group could be largely devoted to
medical cases, another to surgical, or either of these
major divisions could be further split up into, for example, assignments for head cases, mouth surgery, eye
patients, bone injury and disease, gas gangrene, etc.; on
the medical side, wards could be devoted to pneumonia
and other pulmonary diseases, to heart patients, gastrointestinal affections, tuberculosis, acute fevers, and so
on. Such classification of patients also rendered possible
a corresponding grouping of the most experienced officers and the attending nursing staff most highly skilled
along particular and more or less special lines.
The plan also provided for an individual clinical
laboratory for each unit, and a large central laboratory
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doing the bigger, more difficult or more complex work
and often specializing in epidemiologic studies, wound
bacteriology, morbid histology, the preparation of media
on an enormous scale and exerting a controlling and
directing or guiding influence on all the subsidiary units,
5 to 20 in number. In this Central Laboratory were
brought together those officers and technicians most
highly trained, often along more or less special lines,
under the direction of an experienced senior, known as
the Laboratory Officer of the Base, whose duty it was
to co-ordinate and direct the assembled specialists. In
the better equipped and adequately manned Central
Laboratories everything possible in the largest of our
metropolitan laboratories could be as readily done, often
under most skilled direction, for not infrequently talent
of an exceptional order was available.
Centralized hospitalization also permitted welfare
organizations to do their best work; the Red Cross, the
K. of C., the Y's, Christian and also Hebrew, had large
"Huts,'" trained and amateur talent, the latter often
cleaner and better, provided music, reading matter,
smokes and in many ways helped bring life back to men
often glum, bitten by war-dogs and homesick beyond
words. Athletics, entertainments and relaxation could
be organized on a larger scale. I t all helpeel, and the
soldier was not the only one who sought recreation if not
dissipation, just a bit of a fling, which the welfare people
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greatly tempered, and, no doubt, frequently made
mnocuous.
The vision that created these previously unheard-of
programs was wise, comprehensive, and constructive;
that the country was unprepared to fill the order was not
the fault of the planners, but to elaborate a scheme that
matured to 399,510 hospital beds-1 for every 9 men in
the army-and to provide the personnel, equipment and
erect accommodations for 287,290 men, 3000 miles from
the primary base of supply, across a hostile sea frequented by every possible source of marine danger, and
successfully to operate some 200,000 of the beds provided, stands today the supreme achievement in military
relief attained by any nation in the world's history; in
accomplishment it exceeds the combined results of all
efforts of all time antecedent to 1914. The U. S. Navy
deserves the eternal gratitude of all beneficiaries for
completing the difficult and hazardous transportation,
and the Medical Corps of the Army and its advisers the
distinguished honor of having perfected the program
and carried it through to successful and honorable consummation.
Base Hospital "38" constituted a part of the Hospital
Center at Nantes; it was the first hospital on the general
field; No. 34 was earlier on duty and receiving patients
some time previously, was a part of the Center but not
in the group functioning on the Grand Blottereau; in
Nantes "38" was the first completed on the temporary
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barrack plan which was really an American improvement on the British organization made possible by the
experience of predecessors who so gladly and fully gave
of their accumulated knowledge acquired through failure or disappointment as well as attained success. Fortunately hostilities ended before the Center at Nantes.
as well as many other similar provisions, reached anything like completion; however, so far as it went, everything was well done and "38" led in the end attained.
In the preceding and present chapter an effort has
been made to present certain preliminary data without
which much that follows might not be clear. N ow that a
foundation has been laid, the necessary approach, at
least in part, prepared and detailed, the reader may, in
the next chapter, begin to learn of "38," its organization,
mobilization, and participation in the Red Cross and
Army programs hastily outlined in the preceding pages.

Though I have been trained as a
soldier, and participated i~ many battl es, th ere ne ver was a time when, in my
opinion, some way could not be found
to prevent th e drawing of the sword.
Uly sses S . G rant,

· S . A.
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